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1. Introduction 
 It is common for seasoned equity offers (SEOs) in many countries to be made at a 
discount: the offer price of the new shares is below the market price of the existing shares 
when the offer is announced. The existence of a discount complicates the calculation of 
returns on the issuer’s shares during the SEO. The purpose of the paper to analyse the 
calculation of returns during an SEO, and to provide evidence on the impact on event-study 
results of the choices made regarding the method of calculation. The paper discusses the case 
of the UK, which provides a rich field of study since there are three types of SEO currently in 
use, namely rights issues, open offers and placings. The typical discount in rights issues is in 
excess of 30% of the market price, and in open offers and placings it is around 10%. 
Discounts of this size mean that returns during SEOs are strongly affected by whether and in 
what way the returns are adjusted for the discount.1 
 In a rights issue, the rights to buy new shares are issued to the existing shareholders 
pro rata (in proportion) to the existing number of shares they own as at the day before the ex-
rights day. The ex-rights day is the start of the offer period, which lasts for three weeks. 
During the offer period the existing shares trade ex-rights, which means that they cease to 
carry an entitlement to buy new shares, and the rights to the new shares can also be traded in 
the same way as existing shares. The right to buy a new share has value so long as the market 
price of the existing shares exceeds the offer price of the new shares. To buy a new share, the 
holder of a right must subscribe (pay the company) the offer price before the close of the offer 
period. The rights to any shares not subscribed for by the end of the offer period are sold to 
investors who will subscribe, or they are taken up by the underwriters if they cannot be sold, 
or they expire if they cannot be sold and the issue is not underwritten. The ex-rights day is the 
day after the offer is announced, if no extraordinary general meeting (EGM) of the company 
is required to authorise the increase in share capital. If there is an EGM, as is usually the case, 
it is held two or three weeks after the announcement. The ex-day is then the day after the 
EGM, because authorisation has to have been obtained before the rights can be issued. 
 In an open offer, the new shares are normally placed (sold) by private negotiation or 
private bookbuilding with a group of investors, known as placees, before the offer is publicly 
announced. The agreements to buy that are reached before the announcement are mainly 
verbal agreements; legally binding contracts are signed on the announcement day or shortly 
after. On the announcement day, the new shares are offered pro rata to the existing 
shareholders, and the offer period is two weeks. The ex-rights day is the announcement day or 
sometimes the day after, whether or not an EGM is necessary. An EGM need not be held 
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before offering the new shares because no tradable rights are issued. This means that the 
entitlements to the new shares cannot be sold, unlike in a rights issue, so the entitlements are 
worth nothing if the holders do not use them to buy shares by the end of the offer. If an EGM 
is required, as is usually the case, the issue of the shares will be conditional on gaining 
shareholder approval at the EGM, but it is very rare for an issue not to be approved at the 
EGM. If a placee has agreed to buy shares in excess of any shares to which they are entitled 
as a shareholder on a pro rata basis, the final number of shares the placee will receive depends 
on the number taken up by existing shareholders in the pro rata offer. The take-up by existing 
shareholders, and the final allocations of shares to placees, are not known until the end of the 
offer period. 
 The key differences between a rights issue and an open offer are as follows. First, an 
open offer is preceded by a placing, and the placees are not merely underwriters: they will 
expect to receive some shares over and above any entitlement they have to new shares by 
virtue of being shareholders. On average about half of the shares in open offers are not 
subscribed for by the existing shareholders on a pro rata basis (Armitage, 2002). Second, the 
rights cannot be traded in an open offer, and third, the ex-day is usually the announcement 
day. The name ‘open offer’ is potentially misleading, because this type of issue does not 
involve a public offer of shares to investors in general. The informal name ‘placing with 
clawback’ highlights the fact that the shares initially placed with the group of placees can be 
‘clawed back’ by the existing shareholders on a pro rata basis. 
 In a placing or placement, the new shares are placed with one or more investors at a 
common offer price. The shares are not offered pro rata to the existing holders, and there is no 
ex-rights day; these are the crucial differences from a rights issue or open offer, from the 
perspective of calculating returns during the SEO. About ten per cent of rights issues and two 
thirds of open offers are accompanied by a placing of shares, known in this context as ‘firm 
placing’. The shares in the firm placing are not offered pro rata, and so strictly they are not 
part of the rights issue or open offer itself, although there will be a common prospectus and a 
common offer price. We refer to such offers as combined offers. The presence of a firm 
placing in a combined offer means that the choice of method for calculating the return on 
announcement can have a large impact on the return, as we shall see. 
 The three types of offer and the two types of combined offer differ because they have 
different terms. The paper shows how such differences in terms across the types of offer 
affect the calculation of share returns, and discusses the choices that confront the researcher. 
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There is no one method of calculation that is applicable to all types of offer. As far as we are 
aware, no previous study explores comprehensively the calculation of returns during an SEO.  
 The primary question is the calculation of returns for an event study. Such returns are 
intended to measure the information effect of the SEO announcement, ie the change in the 
market value of the issuer’s equity around the time of the announcement that is due to news of 
the SEO, as a percentage of the pre-announcement equity value. A change might be caused by 
news other than the SEO announcement in a particular case, but the event-study method 
assumes implicitly that the average of the returns that are due to other news is approximately 
zero across a given sample. The calculation of returns is not a problem in event studies of 
most types of event, but it is a problem with SEOs. A crucial decision is whether or not to 
calculate discount-adjusted returns, that is, returns that are gross of the value of the discount 
to buyers. We show that returns on the ex-day for an event study should be discount-adjusted 
for rights issues and open offers. The loss on the ex-day of the entitlement to buy shares at a 
discount entails a loss of value for the old shares which is not due to a change in the issuer’s 
equity value, ie it is not due to the arrival of information. So the value of the discount should 
be added back when measuring the information effect. 
 Practice in previous UK event studies of rights issues and open offers has been to use 
returns adjusted for the theoretical ex-rights price (TERP) on the ex-day (for example, 
Armitage, 2002; Barnes & Walker, 2006). The TERP is the price which would obtain on the 
ex-day were there to be no change in equity value; it is lower than the share price before the 
ex-day, if the offer is at a discount. The TERP adjustment has the effect of increasing the 
measured return on the ex-day in offers at a discount, compared with the unadjusted return. 
We show that the return using the TERP adjustment measures some of the information effect, 
but not all of it. This is a new result. The use of discount-adjusted returns makes a material 
difference for open offers in particular, because the ex-day is usually the announcement day. 
As this is when the stock market is first informed of the offer, via the Regulatory News 
Service of the London Stock Exchange, it is the day on which much of the change in price in 
response to news of the offer normally occurs. Discount-adjusted returns make much less 
difference in rights issues, because the ex-day in a rights issue is usually at least two weeks 
after the announcement day. 
 There is an important distinction to be made about the impact of the discount on the 
share price. The size of the discount might be part of the information that affects equity value 
on announcement. For example, if the offer price is set lower than expected, this might be 
seen by investors as a negative sign about the company, and so it might be a reason for a fall 
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in the market value. The fall in market value, if there is one, is the information effect of the 
announcement. This is not the impact of the discount that is being adjusted for when using a 
discount-adjusted return on the ex-day. The impact that the discount-adjusted return allows 
for is the mechanical effect of selling new shares at less than market price. For example, 
suppose the share price is 100p and there are 100 shares in issue. The company announces an 
issue of 100 new shares at a price of 50p, and shareholders are entitled to buy the new shares 
on a pro rata basis. The ex-day is the same as the announcement day, as in most open offers. 
If there is no change in the market value of the equity on announcement, the share price will 
fall to 75p, not because news of the offer has changed the market’s valuation of the firm - it 
has not, by assumption - but because the issue has caused the value per share (old plus new) 
to fall, and the existing shares no longer carry an entitlement to buy the ‘cheap’ new shares, 
because the shares have gone ex-rights. 
 The case for discount-adjusted returns for placings is less clear, for the following 
reason. The new shares are not offered pro rata to the existing shareholders, and this means 
that the value of the discount in a placing could be viewed as a predictable fee to buyers, one 
that is already reflected in the share price. If so, the size of the discount should not affect the 
share price when the offer price is announced, and the returns for an event study should be left 
unadjusted, because the unadjusted returns will measure the information effect correctly. In a 
rights issue or open offer, in contrast, the discount is not a fee at all, because the existing 
shareholders are entitled to benefit from the discount. The share price falls on the ex-day, 
other things being equal, because the old shares lose the entitlement to buy new shares at the 
discounted offer price, and not because the discount imposes a cost on the existing 
shareholders.  
 The ‘no-adjustment view’ for returns in a placing also requires an assumption that 
investors can anticipate, at least roughly, when the company will carry out SEOs and in what 
amounts, in which case the costs of such SEOs, including the discount, are among the 
predictable costs of the company. But if the discount is viewed as unexpected, the value of the 
discount to buyers is a cost to the existing shareholders, because they are not entitled to buy 
the new shares. So news of this cost will affect the share price on announcement. The 
‘adjustment view’ for returns in a placing assumes that the share price falls by the cost of the 
discount, other things equal, and defines the information effect as the change in equity value 
on announcement excluding (gross of) the assumed impact of the cost of the discount. On this 
view, the information effect should be measured gross of the impact of the cost of the 
discount on the share price, and this calls for an adjustment to the returns.2 As it is unclear 
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which view is correct, we suggest that the returns for placings are calculated both ways, as is 
the practice in several US event studies of private placements (for example, Hertzel et al, 
2002; Krishnamurthy et al, 2005). We also propose a third method for calculating a discount-
adjusted return which is in between the two extremes of no adjustment and full adjustment for 
the discount. 
 The empirical section illustrates the impact on event-study results of the choice of 
calculation method for returns. We find that using discount-adjusted returns increases the 
estimated average abnormal return (AAR) on announcement of open offers and placings by 
about five percentage points, compared with the AAR from returns conventionally calculated 
from Datastream’s prices adjusted for capital changes. In addition, there is a strong negative 
correlation between abnormal returns and discounts if conventional returns are used, but there 
is no significant correlation if discount-adjusted returns are used. So the choice of calculation 
method for returns matters considerably in practice. This is likely to be the case whatever 
choices are made with respect to other aspects of event-study methodology. 
 The paper also examines the calculation of the returns to shareholders during an SEO, 
ie the returns a shareholder actually receives. In an SEO, the returns to shareholders and the 
returns for an event study can differ: a discount-adjusted return is designed to measure the 
information effect, if an adjustment for the discount is thought to be appropriate, but it does 
not measure the return to shareholders. A point about calculating the return to shareholders 
arises with the return on the ex-rights day in rights issues and open offers. We show that the 
ex-day return with the TERP adjustment only measures the return to a shareholder if it is 
assumed that the shareholder subscribes immediately for all the shares to which they are 
entitled, so the shareholder is assumed to invest new cash. The return is different, and is less 
convenient to calculate, if the shareholder is assumed not to invest new cash. 
 The next section analyses how the returns to shareholders and returns for an event 
study are calculated for each type of offer, including combined offers. Section 3 provides 
evidence on the returns prior and subsequent to making an adjustment for the discount. 
Section 4 summarises the paper’s discussion and findings. 
 
2. Adjustments for discounts in calculating returns 
2.1 Purpose of adjustments 
 Returns to shareholders. It is standard practice for data providers to record share 
prices that have been adjusted for certain ‘capital changes’, including scrip issues, share 
consolidations, and rights issues and open offers.3 The reason for the adjustments is so that 
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the adjusted prices can be used to calculate the correct returns to shareholders. Two 
conditions need to be met for a capital change to warrant an adjustment to prices. 
(a) The capital change must in theory cause the unadjusted price of the existing shares to 
change, independently of any change in the equity value of the company at the same time, 
because the capital change creates new shares that give ownership of the equity on 
different terms from the old shares. 
(b) The change in the unadjusted price that is caused by the capital change must not affect the 
value of a given shareholding, because each old share carries an entitlement to new shares 
that offsets the impact of the new shares on the value of the old shares.  
If these two conditions are satisfied, and no adjustment to prices is made, then the unadjusted 
price series will produce a return to shareholders that is incorrect on the day the capital 
change takes effect. 
 Returns for an event study. The returns for an event study are intended to measure the 
information effect of the event. When new shares are to be issued at a price that differs from 
the market price of the old shares, the returns to shareholders around the announcement day 
may not measure the information effect correctly, depending on the type of offer. In these 
cases a different calculation needs to be made, and the returns to shareholders will differ from 
the returns for an event study. 
 
2.2 Rights issue 
 Return to shareholders on the ex-day: the TERP adjustment. We now discuss the 
calculation of returns by type of issue, starting with a rights issue. In nearly all UK rights 
issues the offer price is below the share price as at day ex–1. The presence of this discount 
means that condition (a) in Section 2.1 is satisfied: the new shares give ownership of the 
equity on different (better) terms from the terms of the old shares. The capital change takes 
effect when the shares go ex-rights, because from that time the old shares cease to carry the 
entitlement to subscribe. Under certain assumptions, the entitlement attached to shares bought 
before the ex-day means that condition (b) is satisfied exactly: the fact that the old shares go 
ex-rights has no impact on the value of a given shareholding on the ex-day. The three 
assumptions are: 
(i) the equity value of the company does not change on the ex-day: Vex–1 = Vex. In other 
words, no information arrives on the ex-day that affects the company’s value; 
(ii)  the offer is at a discount or at the market price: Pex–1 ≥ Poffer; 
(iii) the proceeds PofferNnew are certain.  
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Vex–1 is the value of the equity as at day ex–1, the day before the ex-rights day, including the 
new cash to be invested as equity; Pex–1 is the unadjusted share price as at the close of day ex–
1; Poffer is the offer price of the new shares; Nnew is the number of new shares. 
 The company will not in fact receive the new cash until at least three weeks after the 
ex-day. But if the proceeds are certain, the company’s market value from the AD will be the 
value as though the cash had been received. So we can write 
 Vex = Vex–1   =    Pex–1Nold + PofferNnew (1) 
where Nold is the number of existing shares.4 After the old shares go ex-rights, they are the 
same as the new shares, and so they will have the same market price, given by Vex/N, where N 
= Nold + Nnew. It follows from this and from (1) that 
 Pex = Vex/N    =   Vex–1/N   =   (Pex–1Nold + PofferNnew)/N (2) 
Equation (2) says that, under assumptions (i), (ii) and (iii), the ex-rights price is given by the 
formula on the right-hand side. This is the standard TERP formula, to be found in some 
textbooks (eg Arnold, 2008, p. 384).5 
 In an offer at a discount, the price of the old shares falls when they go ex-rights, 
assuming no change in equity value (assumption (i)), because the old shares lose a valuable 
entitlement to buy new shares. But the value of an existing holding including the entitlement 
will be unchanged. The value per old share of the entitlement at the close of the ex-day, Entex, 
is given by:6,7 
 Entex = (Pex – Poffer)Nnew/Nold  (3) 
We have seen that, under the three assumptions, Pex is given by the formula for TERP in (2).  
Using this, we can write 
 Pex–1 – Entex = Pex–1 – (TERP – Poffer)Nnew/Nold 
or  Pex–1 = TERP + Entex (4)  
So the value of a holding will be unchanged on the ex-day, and condition (b) is satisfied 
exactly. 
 The value of a holding on the ex-day is Entex/Pex per cent higher than the value 
measured using the ex-rights price alone, Pex. This is why an adjustment is needed in order to 
calculate the correct return to a shareholder. With no change in equity value, the adjusted 
return, Rterpadj,ex, is given by 
 Rterpadj,ex = (Pex + Entex)/Pex–1 – 1 
  = Pex/[Pex–1 × Pex/(Pex + Entex)] – 1 
  = Pex/[Pex–1 × TERP/Pex–1] – 1 (5) 
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The step to the last line uses (2) and (4). Equation (5) shows the TERP adjustment: the price 
before the ex-day, and all previous prices, are scaled down by multiplying them by an 
adjustment factor, AF, given by 
 AF = TERP/Pex–1  
We now examine the TERP adjustment further by relaxing in turn the assumptions used to 
derive it. 
 Assumption (i) does not hold: equity value changes on the ex-day. If the equity value 
changes, Pex ≠ TERP, and (4) will not hold exactly. There is now no unique ex-day return to 
shareholders. The return depends on the decision of the individual shareholder with regard to 
how much to subscribe. We show, first, that the TERP adjustment results in the return to a 
shareholder who subscribes for their full entitlement of shares at the start of the ex-day, the 
instant the shares go ex-rights. Such a subscriber invests PofferNnew/Nold per old share in the 
company, and so the shareholder’s holding on which the return is calculated is larger. The 
assumption of immediate subscription is slightly unrealistic, in that the shareholder would 
normally wait until the offer close before subscribing, and would not subscribe unless Pex,close 
≥ Poffer. 
 The ex-day return on the holding of a subscriber, including their new shares, is 
 Rsubscriber,ex = [Pex + Entex + PofferNnew/Nold – (Pex–1 + PofferNnew/Nold)] 
   ÷ (Pex–1 + PofferNnew/Nold)  
  = [PexNold + (Pex – Poffer)Nnew – Pex–1Nold] ÷ (Pex–1Nold + PofferNnew) 
  = Pex/TERP – 1  
which is the same as (5). Thus, the TERP adjustment is correct for an immediate subscriber, 
even if equity value changes. The reason is that the TERP is the price per share at the start of 
the ex-day of a holding of old shares plus new shares bought pro rata at the offer price. The 
return in (5) is not the exact return from a cash-neutral or buy-and-hold strategy of holding the 
old shares without investing or realising cash. The formula for the buy-and-hold return is 
derived in the Appendix. 
 Assumption (ii) does not hold: the offer is at a premium (Pex–1 < Poffer). In this case 
condition (b) for adjustment of the price series is not met. The entitlement to new shares has 
zero value on the ex-day because the entitlement cannot have a negative value. So there 
should be no adjustment to prices before the ex-day if the offer is at a premium. With no 
adjustment, the ex-day return to a shareholder is simply Pex/Pex–1 – 1. 
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 Assumption (iii) does not hold: the proceeds are not certain. The issue will almost 
certainly proceed so long as the share price is at or above the offer price at the offer close, ie 
Pclose ≥ Poffer. If Pclose < Poffer, the issue will only proceed if it is underwritten. If it is not 
underwritten, the possibility that the issue will not proceed because Pclose < Poffer means that 
Vex–1 and Vex are not given precisely by Pex–1Nold + PofferNnew, and equation (1) does not 
follow. However, the value of the entitlement that is lost on the ex-day is not affected by 
whether the issue is underwritten, because the value of the entitlement is zero at the offer 
close if Pclose < Poffer, whether or not the issue is underwritten. 
 
 Returns for an event study. The ‘capital change’ in a rights issue occurs when the 
shares go ex-rights, which is after the announcement day (AD). As a result, no adjustment is 
needed for measuring the information effect on the AD so long as Pad, the unadjusted share 
price as at the close of the AD, is above Poffer. Any change in the market’s valuation of the 
company before the ex-day is captured in the return on the old shares, because they still carry 
entitlement to the new shares. The information effect (change in equity value) on the AD is 
given by Vad – PofferNnew – Vad–1. V is the market value of the equity, including the new cash 
PofferNnew on the AD but not on AD–1, because the market does not know about the issue 
before the AD. Therefore, the information effect is (Pad – Pad–1)Nold, which is the change in 
market value of the old shares. This shows that all of the information effect on announcement 
is captured by the old shares in a rights issue at a discount. 
 If Pad < Poffer, and the offer is underwritten, then the fact that shares will be sold at a 
price exceeding the current market price is affecting the market price in a mechanical way, 
that is distinct from any information effect from news of Poffer. The underwriters are expected 
to be buying shares at a loss, assuming the best guess of the market price at the close of the 
offer is Pad. The expected loss to the underwriters is a gain to the shareholders, which affects 
Pad. Therefore an adjustment to the return for the AD is needed to measure the information 
effect, and the adjustment is explained in the next section. 
 The ex-date might be included in the event period; the ex-date in some rights issues is 
the day after the AD. In this case the ex-day return for an event study should be measured by 
the discount-adjusted return, given by (10) below, rather than by Rterpadj,ex in (5). We shall see 
why in the context of open offers. 
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2.3 Open offer 
 Returns to shareholders. An open offer at a discount satisfies condition (a) for 
adjustment: the discount affects the price of the old shares when the shares go ex-rights. 
However, condition (b), that the change in price because of the discount does not affect the 
value of a given holding, is only satisfied if the shareholder subscribes. Otherwise the 
shareholder suffers a loss on the ex-day, equal to Pex–1 – TERP assuming no change in equity 
value, and the loss cannot be offset by selling the rights. So it is less clear that condition (b) is 
satisfied in an open offer than in a rights issue. But all the shares carry the same entitlement as 
at day ex–1, giving the same opportunity to subscribe and to realise the value of the 
entitlement. It would be misleading for the price series not to reflect the existence of the 
entitlement.  
 The return with the TERP adjustment, Rterpadj,ex, measures the return per old and new 
share on the ex-day to a subscriber in an open offer, as in a rights issue. If Pex–1 ≤ Poffer, no 
adjustment should be made and the return is Pex/Pex–1 – 1. A cash-neutral strategy is also 
possible in an open offer via selling old shares and using the proceeds to buy new shares, 
assuming that Pex > Poffer. The return obtained via this strategy is derived in the Appendix. 
 
 Returns for an event study. The calculation of the ex-day return is critical for open 
offers, because the ex-day is usually the same as the AD in an open offer, and much of the 
information effect occurs on the AD. The ex post value of the entitlement per old share is 
Entex in (3). Since this value is available to any shareholder by subscribing, and since the 
purpose of an event study is to measure the change in equity value per old share, the ex-day 
return for a event study should include the value of the entitlement per old share. 
 The unadjusted price on announcement is 
 Pad =   Pex   =   Vex/N  
and the unadjusted change in the total value of the old shares is 
 (Vex/N)Nold – Vex–1 = (Pex – Pex–1)Nold (6) 
It is clear that the unadjusted change in value does not measure the full change in value, and 
so it is not correct for an event study. The value captured by the new shares, (Pex – Poffer)Nnew, 
is not included in (6). (Pex – Poffer)Nnew can be broken down into two components. First, 
(TERP – Poffer)Nnew is the transfer of wealth to the new shares due to the discount the instant 
the shares go ex-rights. Since this is positive if the offer is at a discount, the unadjusted return 
is biased downwards. Second, (Pex – TERP)Nnew is the information effect captured by the new 
shares. 
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 The return under the TERP adjustment is the return on one old share valued at the 
TERP: 
 Rterpadj,ex = Pex/TERP – 1  
and so, using (5), the change in the value of the old shares, as measured under the TERP 
adjustment, is 
 Rterpadj,ex(TERP)Nold = (Pex – TERP)Nold 
  = (Vex/N)Nold – [(PofferNnew + Pex–1Nold)/N]Nold  
  = (Vex – PofferNnew – Vex–1)Nold/N (7) 
Equation (7) shows that the change in the value of the old shares measured under the TERP 
adjustment captures only the proportion Nold/N of the information effect. The component  
 (Pex – TERP)Nnew = (Vex – PofferNnew – Vex–1)Nnew/N  
is missing from the measured change in (7), ie the information effect captured by the new 
shares is missing. So Rterpadj,ex is the return with only (TERP – Poffer)Nnew added back, the 
value of the discount the instant the shares go ex-rights. Thus, the TERP-adjusted return 
understates the absolute value of the information effect, whether it is positive or negative. 
 If the information effect of an open offer is positive on average, as the existing 
evidence indicates, then the TERP-adjusted return will be biased downwards as a measure of 
the return for an event study. Furthermore the results of an event study will not be comparable 
between a rights issue and an open offer, even if the TERP adjustment is applied in both types 
of issue. As we have seen, all of the information effect on the AD is captured by the old 
shares in a rights issue at a discount, and is correctly measured by the unadjusted return for 
the AD (the TERP adjustment affects the return for the ex-day only). For the bulk of open 
offers, which have the ex-day on the AD, applying the TERP adjustment results in returns in 
which the information effect is understated.  
 If we wish to measure the full information effect as a return on the old shares, we must 
use an adjustment that assigns all of the information effect to the old shares. Such an 
adjustment has been developed by Bradley & Wakeman (1983) and Wruck (1989), and has 
been used in several subsequent studies to measure the market reaction to US private 
placements. The impact of the new information on the value of the old shares is measured as 
 ∆Vold = (Pex  – Pex–1)Nold + (Pex  – Poffer)Nnew  
  = Vex – PofferNnew – Vex–1 (8) 
(from Wruck, p. 26, equation A.5). Equation (8) says that the impact is the change in value of 
the old shares, (Pex – Pex–1)Nold, plus all of the gain or loss for the new shares, (Pex – 
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Poffer)Nnew. The return on each old share that measures the information effect is the discount-
adjusted return, Rdiscadj,ex: 
 Rdiscadj,ex = (∆Vold/Nold)/Pex–1 
  = [N(Pex – Pex–1)/Pex–1 + Nnew(Pex–1 – Poffer)/Pex–1]/Nold 
  = Pex/Pex–1 – 1 + [(Pex – Poffer)Nnew/Nold]/Pex–1 (9) 
  = % change in share price  +  % value of entitlement as at the ex-day 
   per old share   
The step to the second line uses a version of the first line of (8). In equation (9), all of the 
percentage change in equity value on announcement is divided among the old shares only, as 
is clear from line two. 
 The same analysis applies to the ex-day return for an event study in a rights issue. 
However, using the discount-adjusted return on the ex-day will make less difference to the 
returns for rights issues than for open offers, because the ex-day in a rights issue is usually 
two or three weeks after the AD. 
 Rdiscadj,ex is not a return on the old shares that is available to a shareholder. If Pex > 
Poffer, the entitlement has value, but to realise this value in an open offer, the shareholder has 
to subscribe. Then the return on the augmented holding is Rterpadj,ex, which has a smaller 
absolute value than Rdiscadj,ex, as can be seen by comparing equations (7) and (8). If Pex < 
Poffer, the shareholder will not subscribe, and the return is Pex/Pex–1 – 1. This is less negative 
than Rdiscadj,ex, as can be seen from the third line of equation (9). By not subscribing, the 
shareholder forces the placees/underwriters to buy the new shares at a loss, and this loss is not 
borne by the old shares. But under the discount-adjusted return, the loss is allocated to the old 
shares via the term (Pex – Poffer)Nnew/Nold in (9), which is negative when Pex < Poffer. The 
discount-adjusted return should also be used to calculate the event-study return for the AD in 
an underwritten rights issue at a premium, ie with Pad < Poffer, as previously noted. 
 
2.4 Placing 
 In a placing the old shares do not carry an entitlement to the new shares. This means 
that condition (b) for adjustment to the price series is not satisfied. The return to a shareholder 
on the AD is  
 Rad = Pad/Pad–1 – 1  
 To measure the return for an event study, the ex post value of the discount can be 
ascribed to the old shares by calculating Rdiscadj,ad as in (9), with Pad–1 and Pad substituted for 
Pex–1 and Pex. However, the literature is ambivalent about whether this is the best approach. 
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Several event studies of private placements measure returns with no adjustment for the 
discount (Kang & Stulz, 1996; Allen & Phillips, 2000; Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2005; Wu & 
Wang, 2005; Barclay, Holderness & Sheehan, 2007; Maynes & Pandes, 2008; Wruck & Wu, 
2009). Previous event studies of UK placings also make no adjustment for discounts (Slovin, 
Sushka & Lai, 2000; Barnes & Walker, 2006; Balachandran et al, 2009). Other studies of 
placements provide results using both approaches (Wruck, 1989; Hertzel & Smith, 1993; Goh 
et al, 1999; Hertzel et al, 2002; Eckbo & Norli, 2005; Krishnamurthy et al, 2005; 
Marciukaityte et al, 2005). Several of these latter studies argue that the discount-adjusted 
return provides the better measure of the information effect. For example, Krishnamurthy et al 
(2005, p. 221) write that ‘since the positive abnormal returns of 2.21 percent around private 
placements are despite the discount offered to investors, the true abnormal returns (ie the total 
information effect of the placements) are actually higher.’ 
 In a rights issue or open offer, whether to use the TERP-adjusted return or the 
discount-adjusted return for the ex-day depends on the type of return one wishes to calculate, 
as we have seen. But both adjustments are warranted: both the return to shareholders and the 
return for an event study should incorporate the value of the entitlement to subscribe at the 
discounted price that the shares lose on the ex-day, because all existing shareholders are 
entitled to subscribe. The loss of the entitlement on the ex-day entails a loss of value for the 
old shares which is not the result of a fall in the value of the company’s equity. 
 The discount in a placing provides a reward or fee to buyers that existing shareholders 
are compelled to pay, unless they have been invited into the placing. This difference makes it 
questionable whether to measure the event-study return gross of the value of the discount. If 
no adjustment for the discount is made, the value of the discount is ignored, and the fee for 
buyers via the discount is thereby treated in the same way as the fee for the investment bank. 
In a rights issue, open offer or placing, the fee for the investment bank is paid in cash and is 
usually recorded in the prospectus. In US firm-commitment offers, the fee takes the form of 
the underwriter’s spread, plus out-of-pocket (cash) expenses of the issue. The underwriter’s 
spread is the difference between the offer price, paid to the underwriter by investors, and the 
price per share paid to the issuer by the underwriter. Both the cash fees in UK SEOs and the 
underwriter spread in US firm commitments are typically several percent of the issue 
proceeds. But almost no event study measures returns gross of the fee to the investment 
bank.8  
 The argument is presumably that the investment bank’s fee for an SEO is largely 
predictable, and that investors can predict at least roughly when the company will be making 
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SEOs and in what amounts. In this case the predicted fees in future SEOs are already reflected 
in the share price, and the payment of the fee for a given issue should not affect the share 
price on announcement, unless the fee is unexpectedly high or low.9 If the fee is unexpected, 
however, the share price should fall in line with the fee. 
 The view that the offer price has no impact on the share price when announced implies 
that the market and the company can predict the post-announcement share price, and that the 
company sets the offer price to provide the predicted fee for buyers. This is illustrated in 
Example 1 below. In an environment in which companies choose between a rights issue or 
open offer on the one hand, and a placing on the other, the no-impact view also requires the 
market to have predicted the company’s choice of a placing. 
 Should the discounts in placings be viewed as predictable, and hence already ‘in the 
price’ before the announcement, as the investment bank’s fee is assumed to be? If so, then the 
returns for an event study should be calculated using prices with no adjustment, because news 
of the discount should not in itself cause the share price to change. If a discount is not 
expected, the discount-adjusted return should be calculated, in order to measure the 
information effect gross of the negative impact of the cost of the discount on the market price. 
 A further question is the extent to which the issue itself is a surprise. If investors are 
not expecting an SEO from a company in the foreseeable future, and it announces a placing at 
a discount, then both the investment bank’s fee and the discount are costs that have not been 
anticipated, and the announcement-day return should be measured gross of both costs, in 
order to measure the information effect. 
 There is a strong correlation between announcement abnormal returns and discounts in 
UK placings, found in previous studies and in Section 3 below. Price changes on 
announcement are affected by the depth of the discount to the pre-announcement price. This is 
consistent with the view that the wealth transfer caused by the discount is not already in the 
pre-announcement price. But there is another interpretation, which is that a deeper discount 
conveys negative information about the company; it indicates that the pre-announcement 
market price was more likely to have been overvalued. 
 No adjustment for the discount implies an assumption that all of the ex post transfer to 
buyers via the discount is viewed as an expected fee. In practice this results in some 
implausibly large ex post fees, and also some negative fees (when the market price on the AD 
is below the offer price). Instead, the existing share price could be used to estimate the 
expected share price post announcement, the assumption here being that no fall in price is 
expected despite the discount. Then the estimated expected fee per old share via the discount 
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would be (Pad–1 – Poffer)Nnew/Nold, and the return for an event study assuming this fee was 
already in the price, Revent, would be 
 Revent = Rdiscadj,ad – (Pad–1 – Poffer)Nnew/Nold,  
  = [(Pad – Pad–1)/Pad–1]N/Nold (10) 
We suggest that this return, which is net of an ex ante estimate of the value of the discount, 
would provide a more accurate measure of the information effect in a placing than does either 
the discount-adjusted return or the return with no adjustment. However, in the remainder of 
the paper we assume that the choice for an event study is between these latter two returns.10 
 
2.5 Combined offers 
 A final complication is that the majority of open offers, and some rights issues, are 
accompanied by a placing made at the same time as the pro rata issue, and at the same offer 
price. To calculate returns to shareholders during these combined offers, no adjustment should 
be made with respect to the shares in the placing; Nnew in the TERP adjustment should include 
the pro rata shares only. This is because the old shares do not carry an entitlement to 
participate in a placing.  
 The return on the AD for an event study depends on whether we adjust for the 
discount of the shares in the placing. The return should be measured by (9) if we adjust, and 
the figure for Nnew in (9) depends on the type of offer. An open offer with the ex-day on the 
AD is treated the same way as a placing, so Nnew is the total number of new shares. In a rights 
issue, or in an open offer with the ex-day on day AD+1, the return on the AD is measured by 
(9) with Nnew the number of shares in the placing only. On the ex-day the return is measured 
by (9) with Nnew the number of shares in the rights issue or open offer. But if Pad < Poffer, Nnew 
in (9) is always the total number of new shares for the return on the AD. 
 If we do not adjust for the discount of the placing shares, then the presence of an 
accompanying placing makes no difference to the returns for an event study. The returns are 
unadjusted except for the ex-day, for which the discount-adjusted return is calculated, with 
Nnew equal to the number of shares in the rights issue or open offer only. 
 
2.6 Summary and numerical example 
 Table 1 summarises our conclusions about how to calculate the returns on the AD and 
ex-day, assuming that discount-adjusted returns are calculated. Some of the calculations of the 
returns on the AD are illustrated in Example 1. This shows the returns on the AD in an 
equivalent rights issue, open offer (with ex-day on the AD), and placing, given three different 
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changes in equity value on the AD. The example illustrates what happens with and without 
the adjustment for the discount in a placing, and spells out what is implied by the view that 
the discount is a predictable fee. 
 
Table 1 and Example 1 around here 
 
3. Effect of adjustments on abnormal returns 
3.1 Sample and method 
 We now measure the impact of the adjustments on abnormal returns (ARs) on 
announcement, using a sample of 261 UK SEOs made during 2002-06. The purpose is to 
illustrate the impact of the choice of method of calculating returns on actual event-study 
results. The event-study method used is simple; other methods could equally well be used, 
and we would not expect the findings to be especially sensitive to the choices made with 
respect to aspects of event-study method that are separate from the method of calculating the 
share returns. In particular, the choice of model of expected returns makes little difference to 
the results of short-horizon studies, as Fama (1998) observes. We shall see, however, that the 
way the share returns are calculated can make a large difference. 
 The sample consists of 47 rights issues, 134 open offers and 80 placings. To be 
included, an SEO had to have a prospectus and the requisite price data in Datastream, with 
trading in the shares not suspended. Datastream, owned by Thomson Reuters, is widely used 
for research that calls for UK price and accounting data. Nine of the open offers and nine of 
the placings were made at the pre-announcement midpoint market price or at a small 
premium. In the 244 offers made at a discount to the price at AD–1, the mean (median) 
discounts are 36.0% (34.9%) in the rights issues, 17.1% (9.8%) in the open offers, and 15.1% 
(10.1%) in the placings. The source of the information about each issue is the prospectus, 
except that the ex-dates are from the London Share Price Database (LSPD), which is 
maintained by London Business School. Details regarding ex-dates and accompanying 
placings are shown in Table 2. Two thirds of the open offers are accompanied by a ‘firm’ 
(non pro rata) placing, and on average these firm placings are approximately the same size as 
the open offers they accompany. 
 
Table 2 around here 
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 We calculate the AR for a given share as the market-adjusted return over three days 
centred on the AD: 
 ARτ =   Rτ – RM,τ (11) 
where τ = AD–1 to AD+1 and the market return is given by 
 RM,τ =   ln(Mad+1/Mad–2)  
where Mt is the value of the FT-SE All-Share Index at the close of day t. The AD is when the 
issue is first announced in the Regulatory News Service, which is occasionally before the date 
of the prospectus. The calculation of the three-day share return, Rτ, depends on the type of 
return. The return using Datastream’s adjusted prices (code P), RDS,τ, is  
 RDS,τ = ln(PDS,ad+1/PDS,ad–2) (12) 
where PDS,t is the adjusted price for day t. The adjusted prices are supposed to incorporate the 
TERP adjustment, for the shares in rights issues and open offers at a discount to Pex–1. There 
is no adjustment for placings, nor for the shares in the firm-placing component of combined 
offers. To check Datastream’s adjustments, we calculate our own return under the TERP 
adjustment, Rterpadj,τ: 
 Rterpadj,τ = ln[Pad+1/(Pad–2 × TERP/Pex–1)] (13, from eq. (5)) 
where Pt is the unadjusted price from Datastream (code UP). If the ex-day is after AD+1, or 
there is no ex-day because the offer is a placing, the return to shareholders is 
 Rτ = ln(Pad+1/(Pad–2)  
 The discount-adjusted return is 
 Rdiscadj,τ = ln[Pad+1 + (Pad+1 – Poffer)Nnew/Nold]/Pad–2 (14, from eq. (9)) 
for placings, open offers, and for rights issues with the ex-day on AD+1 or accompanied by a 
placing. Nnew in (14) is the total number of shares in the issue except in the case of a rights 
issue accompanied by a placing, with the ex-day after AD+1, in which case Nnew is the 
number of shares in the accompanying placing. For rights issues and open offers with the ex-
day after AD+1, the return for an event study is  
 Rτ = ln(Pad+1/Pad–2)  
 In several cases the company implemented a share consolidation between the 
announcement and the date when the new shares were issued. In these cases the unadjusted 
prices are multiplied by the consolidation factor (for example, 100 times if one share replaces 
100 pre-consolidation shares), so that the unadjusted but consolidated market prices are on the 
same scale as the offer price. 
 
Table 3 around here 
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3.2 Market reaction by type of offer 
 Table 3 shows the three-day average abnormal returns (AARs) by type of offer. In 
order to reduce the influence of outlying observations, the absolute value of ARs is capped at 
30%. There are 31 discount-adjusted ARs with absolute values in excess of 30%. The results 
are qualitatively similar without the cap.11 
 The most striking finding is that the AARs for open offers and placings are 
approximately zero using Datastream’s adjusted prices, whereas they exceed +5% using 
discount-adjusted returns. The differences are economically and statistically significant. The 
reason for the differences is that there is a positive information effect (equity value rises) in 
the majority of cases, some of which is captured by the new shares. The information effect is 
fully incorporated in the discount-adjusted return of the old shares, but not in either the 
unadjusted or TERP-adjusted return.  
 In addition, the returns for open offers are slightly biased downwards using 
Datastream’s adjusted prices. The AAR for open offers using the TERP adjustment is 1.8%, 
compared with 1.0% using Datastream’s adjusted prices, though the difference is not 
significant. Datastream should and usually does make the TERP adjustment, but in some 
cases the adjustment is missing or incorrect, given our information on the ex-dates and terms 
of offers. 125 of the open offers were made at a discount to the pre-announcement price. 
Datastream makes no adjustment for ten of them and for a further 18 the adjustment factor is 
at least 1.005 times higher (nearer to one) than we calculate the correct factor to be. Both 
errors cause downward bias in the ARs. In seven cases the adjustment factor is below 0.995 
times what it should be, which causes upward bias in the ARs. The overall effect is the 
downward bias in the AAR for open offers of 0.8 percentage points that we have noted. This 
problem has also been identified by Armitage & Capstaff (2009) and Espenlaub, Iqbal & 
Strong (2009). The latter note that the LSPD records the correct TERP adjustment factor in 
open offers. In their sample of open offers, from 1991-95, the AAR increases by 4.2% when 
returns are calculated using the LSPD adjustment factors. This increase is much larger than in 
our sample, probably because Datastream’s adjusted prices do not incorporate adjustments for 
any open offers before 2002.12 
 The AAR for rights issues is –3.0% using Datastream’s adjusted prices, and –0.4% 
using discount-adjusted returns; neither is significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
Much of the difference is due to the presence of five rights issues that were accompanied by 
placings, at very large discounts. The discounts appeared to cause large falls in price on 
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announcement, which did not reflect a fall in equity value gross of the value of the discount 
for the shares in the placing. If these five issues are excluded, the discount-adjusted AAR for 
rights issues is –2.0%. The discount-adjusted abnormal returns are only different for the 
minority of rights issues with an ex-day on AD+1. 
 Datastream’s adjustment before the ex-day in rights issues was also checked. In six of 
the 47 rights issues the adjustment factor is at least 1.005 times higher than we calculate it 
should be, and in five it is below 0.995 times what it should be. The impact on the average ex-
day return is –0.5%. So there is less error and less bias in Datastream’s TERP adjustments for 
rights issues than for open offers. The effect of Datastream’s apparent errors on the 
announcement AAR for rights issues turns out to be miniscule (<0.1%). This is because only 
12 of the 47 rights issues have the ex-day on AD+1, and so they are included in our event 
period, and only one of these 12 has a (slightly) incorrect TERP adjustment. Errors of 
adjustment if the ex-day is after the event period make no difference to the announcement 
AR, because both of the prices in (12) have been multiplied by the adjustment factor, and so 
any error is cancelled out. 
 The results of previous event studies of UK SEOs are summarised in Table 4. All use 
TERP-adjusted prices from Extel13 or Datastream, with no further adjustment, except for 
Espenlaub et al (2009) who apply the TERP adjustment from LSPD to Datastream’s 
unadjusted prices. A general finding is that the AAR for open offers and placings is higher 
than for rights issues, and the results in the current paper support that finding. However, the 
announcement AARs for open offers and placings in previous studies are not adjusted for 
discounts. So the contrast in market reaction between these offers and rights issues is greater 
than has previously been thought, if the reaction is calculated gross of the value of the 
discount. Slovin et al (2000) argue that the contrast exists because the certification of issuer 
value by the underwriters is less effective in rights issues than in placings, because the 
underwriting bank in rights issues bears less risk of loss. Another possibility is that the AAR 
is positive for open offers and placings because the market knows that, by the time the issue is 
announced, the shares have been placed with investors with private information about the 
issuer, who are willing to buy at the offer price. So in effect there is certification by the 
placees (Armitage, 2002, 2010). 
 
Table 4 around here 
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 Our finding of a significant AAR for open offers of 1.8% using the TERP adjustment 
tallies approximately with the significant AARs of 2.0% for open offers reported in Armitage 
(2002), and 4.0% in Korteweg & Renneboog (2003). Armitage used adjusted prices from 
Extel rather than Datastream, and Korteweg & Renneboog may also have used Extel. So it 
appears that the TERP adjustments in Extel were less biased than those in Datastream, as 
Armitage and Capstaff (2008) conjecture. However, the Extel database is no longer available. 
 Our results suggest that, if returns are adjusted for discounts, about five percentage 
points should be added to the AARs for placings and open offers in previous studies (three 
points if the AAR for open offers was calculated using Extel prices). The addition would be 
about ten percentage points if our abnormal returns were not capped at 30% (previous studies 
apparently do not exclude small shares or outlying ARs, except Espenlaub et al, 2009).  
Against this, the discounts in our sample are somewhat deeper than those in earlier samples. 
The addition means that the discount-adjusted AARs for open offers and placings are in the 
range 4% to 9%, rather than –1% to 4%. The ARs for samples of rights issues that include 
issues accompanied by a placing are also likely to be biased downwards. 
 
4.3 An example of the impact of adjustment: ARs and discounts 
 The choice of method for calculating event-study ARs can affect the results of 
correlation and regression analyses, as well as the size and sign of AARs, especially when the 
discount is an explanatory variable. Table 5 reports correlation coefficients between ARs and 
discounts to the pre-announcement market price. Using Datastream’s adjusted prices, there is 
a significant negative correlation for all three types of offer; a larger (deeper) discount is 
associated with a lower AR on announcement. The correlations are especially negative for 
open offers (–0.38) and placings (–0.43). Datastream’s adjusted prices incorporate the TERP 
adjustment for shares in open offers, and no adjustment for shares in placings. It appears that 
some of the negative correlation for open offers is due to apparent errors in Datastream’s 
TERP adjustments. The correlation between AR and discount using our own TERP-adjusted 
returns is –0.22 (still significant at the 1% level), compared with –0.38 using Datastream’s 
TERP-adjusted returns. 
 Using discount-adjusted ARs, the correlation is positive for open offers and placings, 
and less negative for rights issues, though it is not significantly different from zero at the 10% 
level for any type of offer. For rights issues the less negative correlation using discount-
adjusted returns is due mainly to the substantial change in the returns for the five issues 
accompanied by a placing. 
 21 
 We see that whether a deeper discount is viewed as a negative signal, ie has a negative 
impact on equity value, depends on the view taken about how the information effect should be 
measured. Previous studies have found that a deeper discount in open offers and placings is 
associated with a lower AR on announcement (Slovin et al, 2000; Armitage; 2002; Korteweg 
& Renneboog, 2003; Balachandran et al, 2009). But they do not calculate discount-adjusted 
returns. We find that the significant negative correlation disappears when discount-adjusted 
returns are used.  
 
Table 5 around here 
 
5. Summary and conclusion 
 The calculation of returns during SEOs requires care if the offers are made at a price 
which differs from the market price. The paper examines the calculations for the three types 
of offer currently in use in the UK, together with combined offers (rights issue plus placing; 
open offer plus placing), and sets out formulae for the returns to shareholders and returns for 
an event study. Returns for an event study are designed to measure the information effect 
(change in equity value) per old share resulting from the announcement of the SEO. When 
new shares are about to be issued, the returns to shareholders may not measure correctly the 
change in the value of the issuer’s equity. So the calculation of the return for an event study 
can be different from the calculation of the return to shareholders. Whether the calculation is 
different depends on the type of offer, and on how the researcher believes that the information 
effect should be measured. 
 Use of a discount-adjusted return (equation (9)) assumes that the information effect 
should be measured gross of the transfer of wealth to buyers caused by the discount. We 
argue that the return on the ex-rights day for an event study in a rights issue or open offer 
should be the discounted-adjusted return, rather than the conventional TERP-adjusted return 
(equation (5)). This is because the shares lose on the ex-day their valuable entitlement to buy 
new shares at a discount, and any given shareholder can capture all of the value of the 
discount by subscribing to the shares to which they are entitled; the discount is not a fee to 
buyers that shareholders are forced to pay. So the value of the entitlement per old share 
should be included in the ex-day return for an event study. We show that the TERP-adjusted 
return does not measure correctly the value of the entitlement per old share, whereas the 
discount-adjusted return does measure this correctly. 
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 The position is less clear in the case of placings, because shareholders do not have the 
right to subscribe in a placing. The choice between using the unadjusted return in an event 
study, or the discount-adjusted return, depends on whether the discount is viewed as 
providing a predictable fee to buyers. If the fee is predicted, its value is already reflected in 
the pre-announcement share price. Then if the discount in relation to the post-announcement 
price in a given offer is as predicted, and the offer itself is not a surprise, the discount should 
not affect the share price on announcement and no adjustment to returns is warranted. If the 
discount is unexpected, the share price should be lower when the discount is announced, and 
the discount-adjusted return should be used to measure the information effect. The presence 
of a discount which is a fee is possibly less predictable when there are alternative offer 
methods in use in which the discount is not a fee. We suggest that, even if the discount is 
viewed as a predictable fee, an ex ante estimate of its value should be used rather than the ex 
post value which implicitly is used when returns are not adjusted. Such an ex post estimate of 
the discount is very variable in practice, and will be negative if Pad < Poffer. An adjusted return 
that measures the information effect using an ex ante estimate of the discount is given by 
equation (10). 
 The paper also studies the ex-day return to shareholders in rights issues and open 
offers. This is a different calculation from the return for an event study. We show that the ex-
day return to a shareholder depends on whether the holder invests new cash to subscribe for 
all the new shares to which they are entitled, or does not invest but sells rights or old shares. 
The TERP-adjusted return on the ex-day is exactly correct either if there is no change in 
equity value on the ex-day, which is a special case, or if the shareholder subscribes 
immediately to the new shares to which they are entitled. It is not the return from a buy-and-
hold strategy, in which no new cash is invested. We present the buy-and-hold return in the 
Appendix but we note that it is less convenient to calculate than the TERP-adjusted return. 
 The paper shows empirically that the choice made about the method of calculating 
returns makes a substantial difference to the average returns and cross-section of returns 
during an SEO. We find in our sample that using discount-adjusted returns results in average 
abnormal returns on the announcement of open offers and placings that are about five 
percentage points higher than returns from Datastream’s prices adjusted for capital changes, 
after capping the impact of outlying abnormal returns. In addition, which calculation of 
returns is used is likely to have an impact on the results of cross-sectional analyses with the 
announcement abnormal return as the dependant variable, especially when the discount is an 
explanatory variable. There is a strong negative correlation in open offers and placings 
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between the abnormal return and the size (depth) of the discount when TERP-adjusted prices 
are used, as is standard practice in previous studies. TERP-adjusted prices incorporate the 
TERP adjustment for shares in an open offer, and no adjustment for shares in a placing. The 
negative correlation between abnormal return and discount disappears when using discount-
adjusted returns. 
 No previous event study of UK SEOs has used discount-adjusted returns. There is a 
case for following the practice of several US studies, and calculating returns both with and 
without adjustment for the discount, as detailed in Table 1. The case is especially strong for 
open offers. We argue that adjustment for the discount of shares in an open offer or rights 
issue is clearly warranted when calculating the ex-day return, and the adjustment is likely to 
make a material difference to event-study results for open offers, since the ex-day is usually 
the announcement day. 
 The same or similar considerations will arise in the calculation of returns during SEOs 
in other countries. Researchers should take due account of the terms of the offers in their 
samples when calculating returns, and should check the adjustments for discounts, if any, that 
have been made in the price data they are using. They need to decide which type of returns 
they wish to calculate. For open offers and placings, and for rights issues accompanied by a 
placing, how the wealth transfer to buyers is treated is likely to make a substantial difference 
to the results.  
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Appendix: alternatives to the TERP adjustment in rights issues and open offers 
 In a rights issue the shareholder can sell rights on the market during the offer period. 
The return to a nonsubscriber, who sells all their rights at the end of the ex-day, is 
 Rnonsubscriber,ex = (Pex + Entex)/Pex–1  –  1 (A1) 
This differs from Rterpadj,ex in (5); the return in (A1) exceeds (5) when Pex > TERP, ie when 
equity value rises, and is lower than (5) when equity value falls.14 So an alternative to the 
TERP adjustment would be to use (A1); that is, to make no adjustment to prices before the ex-
day, and to add Entex to Pex when calculating the ex-day return.15 
 A further possibility is that the shareholder neither invests nor realises cash, but sells 
rights and uses the proceeds to subscribe for new shares at the end of the ex-day. It turns out 
that this results in the same ex-day return as the return for a nonsubscriber. Let erightsissuneutralf  be 
the fraction of a new share obtained per old share via a cash-neutral strategy in which the 
holder sells the proportion of their rights that enables all the remaining rights to be taken up 
with the proceeds: 
 erightsissuneutralf  = (1 – Poffer/Pex)Nnew/Nold  
Poffer/Pex is the proportion of the rights required to be sold to implement the strategy.16 So the 
return on a shareholding under the cash-neutral strategy, erightsissuneutralR , is 
 erightsissuneutralR  = Pex(1 + 
erightsissu
neutralf )/Pex–1 – 1  
  = (Pex + Entex)/Pex–1 – 1 (A1) 
So the return in (A1) is the buy-and-hold return. The difference between the two choices is 
that selling all the rights results in the shareholder realising cash and owning fewer shares 
than they end up owning under the cash-neutral strategy. 
 A drawback of (A1) is that it involves a special calculation for the ex-day. Returns 
using the TERP adjustment are easier to calculate; once the prices before the ex-day have 
been adjusted, the return calculation for the ex-day is no different from that for other days. 
Another worry about (A1) is that it ignores the transaction cost of selling rights. Armitage 
(2007) presents evidence that the cost of selling very large blocks of rights is at least 50% of 
the rights’ value, in order to provide the buyers of the new shares with an acceptable discount 
to the price of the old shares. In view of these concerns, it seems preferable for the ex-day 
return to a shareholder to be calculated by Rterpadj,ex. 
 In an open offer the shareholder must sell shares rather then rights in order to obtain a 
cash-neutral subscription. The entitlements attached to shares sold on the ex-date can be 
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subscribed for (but not sold) by the selling shareholder. The number of new shares bought per 
old share in the original holding is 
 openofferneutralf  = Nnew/Nold, or Pex/Poffer if selling all the old shares does not raise 
enough cash to enable the purchase of all the holder’s entitlement 
shares.  
The ex-day return on each old share, ignoring the extra return from buying new shares, is 
Pex/Pex–1 – 1, whether or not the share is sold. Each new share bought provides an additional 
return of (Pex – Poffer)/Pex–1. So the return to a shareholder from the cash-neutral strategy is 
given by 
 openofferneutralR  = [Pex + 
openoffer
neutralf (Pex – Poffer)]/Pex–1 – 1  
This is the same as (A1) if selling old shares raises enough raises enough for purchase of all 
the shareholder’s entitlement. openofferneutralR , like 
erightsissu
neutralR , is inconvenient to calculate compared 
with Rterpadj,ex. 
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Footnotes 
1.  The focus of the paper is on the calculation of returns, not on why researchers are 
interested in SEO announcements. See Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2007) for a comprehensive 
review of research on SEOs that includes both event-study evidence and research on the 
determinants of offer-price discounts. 
2. If the SEO itself is a complete surprise, then arguably the returns should be gross of 
the impact of both the fees for the issue and the discount, since both are unexpected costs for 
the company. This is discussed further in Section 2.4 
3. In a scrip issue, the number of shares in issue is increased by giving shareholders n 
new shares for each existing share, where n exceeds zero. In a share consolidation, the 
number of shares in issue is reduced by replacing n existing shares with one new share, where 
n exceeds one. 
4. This ignores for simplicity the fact that the present value of the new cash as at day ex–
1 is slightly less than PofferNnew. 
5. It is sometimes the case that the new shares are not entitled to the next dividend, Div. 
Then the TERP formula is [(Pex–1Nold + (Poffer + Div)Nnew)/N]/Pex–1. 
6. Rights are call options in which the exercise price is the offer price and the expiry date 
is the offer close. So in theory a right should be worth slightly more than Pex – Poffer. We 
ignore this for simplicity. 
7. If the new shares are not entitled to the next dividend, Div, the value of the entitlement 
will be Entex = [Pex – (Poffer + Div)]Nnew/Nold. 
8. An exception is Hull & Kerchner (1996), who argue that a large part of the negative 
average abnormal return on announcement of US firm-commitments represents the costs of 
issue. They measure the information effect of the SEO announcement by adding the costs of 
issue per old share to the prevailing share price at the end of the event window. Eckbo & 
Masulis (1992, p. 322) also present some results with the costs of issue added back. 
9. For example, consider a project with cash in hand of £50 and cash flows of –£50 at 
date 1 and +£120 at date 2. Assume a discount rate of zero. The project’s value at date 0 is 
£120. At date 1 the £50 cash is paid out, but its value remains at £120. 
10. US firm-commitment offers, not used in the UK, are different again. There is no pro 
rata offer to existing shareholders. The offer price is set the day before the shares are issued, 
about one month after the AD. The offer price used to be set at or very close to the market 
price the day before the issue day, but discounts of a few per cent have become normal in the 
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USA since the 1990s. Adler & Shea (2010) discuss returns during firm commitments. They 
include the value of the discount in their two-day return for the issue date. 
11. Twenty-one of the 31 shares with a discount-adjusted AR with an absolute value in 
excess of 30% are very small, with a market capitalisation as at AD–1 of less than £10m. It 
could be argued that for such small, infrequently traded shares, the share price is a rather 
rough guide to the market’s valuation. In some cases the issue is extremely large in relation to 
the pre-issue size of the company, and so the discount-adjusted AR is very sensitive to the 
difference Pad+1 – Poffer (see eq. (14)). 
12. Other errors in Datastream (and CRSP) prices are documented by Ince & Porter 
(2006). 
13.  The Extel Financial database was established as an electronic database in the mid-
1980s, originally to contain the company information recorded on hard-copy Extel cards, 
which had been published since 1922. In the early 1990s the database was expanded to 
include share price data. Extel was eventually acquired by Thomson Reuters, who ceased to 
make the database available in 2005. 
14. It is easy to show that the derivative of (A1) with respect to Pex, (1 + Nnew/Nold)/Pex–1, 
exceeds the derivative of (5) with respect to Pex, 1/TERP. With no change in equity value, Pex 
= TERP and (A1) = (5) = 0. Both (5) and (A1) switch sign at this value for Pex. 
15. What if the shareholder sells their rights at the start of the ex-day, the instant the 
shares go ex-rights? The return for day ex–1 would then be (Pex* + Entex*)/Pex–2 – 1, where 
Pex* is the ex-rights price at the start of the ex-day, and Entex* = (Pex* – Poffer)Nnew/Nold. The 
return for the ex-day would be Pex/Pex* – 1. If Pex* = TERP, the TERP adjustment is correct; 
otherwise the analysis is similar to that in the text. 
16. Let Nj be the number of rights owned by holder j and x be the required proportion of 
the rights to be sold. x is found by solving 
 Nj(1 – x)  =  Njx[(Pex – Poffer)/Poffer] 
The left hand side is the number of rights that is retained and subscribed for if the proportion x 
is sold, and the right hand side is the number of new shares that can be bought from the 
proceeds of selling proportion x. 
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Example 1 
Returns on the announcement date (AD) in a rights issue, open offer, and placing 
 
The example compares the returns in an equivalent rights issue, open offer (with ex-day on 
the AD), and placing, underwritten in each case, assuming three different changes in equity 
value (= information effect) on the AD. The formulae for the returns are summarised in Table 
1 and explained in Section 3. 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Assumptions 
Number of old shares: Nold 100 
Number of new shares: Nnew 100 
Equity value on AD–1: Vad–1   £200 
Share price before ex-date or AD: Pad–1 = Vad–1/Nold   £2.00 
Offer price: Poffer   £1.80 
Proceeds of share issue: PofferNnew   £180 
 
Alternative equity values on ex-day or AD Case A Case B Case C 
Equity value on AD, including new cash: Vad £300 £380 £500 
Change in value: Vad – PofferNnew – Vad–1 –£80 £0 £120 
 
Rights issue (ex-day is after AD) 
Price on AD: Pad–1 + change in value/Nold if change  £1.50 £2.00 £3.20 
on AD ≥ –£20; Vad/N if change < –£201 
Return to shareholder: Pad/Pad–1 – 1 –25.0% 0.0% 60.0% 
Discount-adjusted return: Pad/Pad–1 – 1; 
[(Pad – Pad–1) + (Pad – Poffer)Nnew/Nold]/Pad–1 if Pad < Poffer –40.0% 0.0% 60.0% 
 
Open offer (ex-day is same as AD) 
Price on AD: Pad = Pex = Vex/N £1.50 £1.90 £2.50 
TERP: (Pex–1Nold + PofferNnew)/N £1.90 £1.90 £1.90 
Return to shareholder (subscriber): 
Pex/TERP – 1; Pex/Pex–1 – 1 if Pex < Poffer –25.0% 0.0% 31.6% 
 
Placing (no ex-day) 
Price on AD: Pad = Vad/N £1.50 £1.90 £2.50 
Return to shareholder (nonsubscriber): Pad/Pad–1 – 1 –25.0% –5.0% 25.0% 
 
Discount-adjusted return in an open offer or placing:  
[(Pad – Pad–1) + (Pad – Poffer)Nnew/Nold]/Pad–1 –40.0% 0.0% 60.0% 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1If the change in value is below –£20, Pad < Poffer, and the relationship between Vad and Pad 
changes. See Section 2.2. Continued... 
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Example 1 continued 
 
Discussion. The pre-announcement value is £200, the new cash raised is £180, and the 
discount to the pre-announcement price is 10%. The change in equity value on the AD is –£80 
in Case A, £0 in Case B, and £120 in Case C. The discount-adjusted returns are, respectively, 
–40.0%, 0.0% and +60.0%, ie they are the change in equity value as a percentage of the pre-
announcement value. The returns to shareholders depend on the type of offer, as we now 
explain. 
 
Case A. The change in equity value is –40%. The share price on the AD falls 25% to £1.50 in 
all three types of offer, which is below the offer price. Shareholders are assumed not to 
subscribe, and the return to a (nonsubscribing) shareholder is –25% in each offer. The 
underwriters or placees share some of the loss in value, since they are assumed to have to buy 
new shares at the offer price. Had the offer not been underwritten, the share price might have 
fallen by as much as 40%, reflecting the underlying percentage fall in equity value, and 
reflecting the likelihood that no new shares would be issued. 
 
Case B. There is no change in equity value. The return to a shareholder is 0% in the rights 
issue and 0% in the open offer (for a subscriber). It is –5% in the placing, because 
shareholders do not have the right to subscribe, and with no change in equity value the share 
price falls by the value per old share of the discount. 
 
Case C. The gain in equity value is 60%. This is also the return to a shareholder in the rights 
issue; all the information effect on the AD is captured by the old shares, because the AD is 
before the ex-day. The return to a subscriber in the open offer is only 32%, and the shortfall 
compared with 60% arises because, under the TERP adjustment, the measured gain per old 
share is only Pex – TERP = 60p, rather than 120p when the full gain in value is assigned to the 
old shares via the discount-adjusted return. The cost of an old share is the TERP (= £1.90) 
under the TERP adjustment, rather than Pex–1 (= £2.00). We are comparing 120p/200p = 60% 
with 60p/190p = 32%. The return to a shareholder in the placing is lower still, at 25%. Not 
only does the non-purchasing shareholder miss 60p per old share of the gain in value on 
announcement, but the discount transfers (TERP – Poffer)Nnew/Nold = 10p per old share to the 
new shares. So the return is lower by 70p/200p = 35 percentage points than the discount-
adjusted return. 
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Alternative view for placings: the discount as a predictable fee. Suppose now that the ex post 
value of the discount in a placing is viewed as a fee that is already reflected in the share price. 
The company is assumed to anticipate the change in share price on announcement, and to set 
the offer price to provide the predicted fee. This implies that the return for an event study does 
not involve adjustment for the discount, and that the changes in equity value are measured net 
of the value of the discount. 
 
One way to represent this is to imagine that the buyers pay the full post-announcement share 
price, and at the same time receive a cash payment from the company equal to the value of the 
discount. The cash payment is predicted and therefore does not affect the share price. The 
three cases would then look as follows. 
 Case A Case B Case C 
 
Price on AD £1.50 £1.90 £2.50 
Offer price £1.80 £1.80 £1.80 
 
Equity value on AD, including new cash £300 £380 £500 
Less new cash assuming 100 shares bought at price on AD £150 £190 £250 
Less equity value on AD–1 £200 £200 £200 
Equals measured change in equity value –£50 –£10 £50 
As a percentage of equity value on AD–1 (= unadjusted return) –25% –5% 25% 
 
Assumed cash payment to buyers (= value of discount) £–30 £10 £70 
 
In Case C, for example, the new shares have a market value of £250, although the new 
investors only contribute £180. So the value of the discount is £70. The equity value will not 
fall by £70 on announcement, in the absence of any information effect, because the market is 
assumed to expect a discount worth £70. To capture this, the change in equity value is 
measured as £50 rather than £120. In Case A the offer is at a premium ex post; £30 is paid by 
buyers to the company. The change in equity value is measured as –£50 rather than –£80. In 
this case the pre-announcement share price is assumed, perhaps implausibly, to incorporate an 
expected sum paid to the company. 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 1 
Returns to shareholders and returns for an event study 
 
The table summarises the methods presented in Sections 2.2 to 2.5 of calculating the 
percentage returns on the AD and ex-day in rights issues, open offers, placings, and rights and 
open offers combined with a placing. The returns are defined as follows: unadjusted return on 
the AD: Rad = Pad/Pad–1 – 1; unadjusted return on the ex-day: Rex = Pex/Pex–1 – 1; return to 
shareholders on the ex-day with TERP adjustment: Rterpadj,ex = Pex/TERP – 1 (eq. (5)); 
discount-adjusted return on the ex-day: Rdiscadj,ex = [(Pex – Pex–1) + (Pex – Poffer)Nnew/Nold]/Pex–
1 (eq. (9)). Rdiscadj,ad is the same as Rdiscadj,ex, but with Pad and Pad–1 substituted for Pex and 
Pex–1. All the prices used in the formulae are unadjusted prices. 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Return to shareholder   Return for an event study 
 
Rights issue: AD Unadjusted return: Rad Unadjusted return: Rad,  
  or Rdiscadj,ad if Pad < Poffer 
 
 
Rights issue Unadjusted return: Rad Rdiscadj,ad with Nnew = no. of shares 
with placing: AD  in placing or with Nnew = total  
   no. of new shares if Pad < Poffer1 
 
Rights issue: ex-day TERP adjustment: Rterpadj Rdiscadj,ex2  
(ex-day is after AD) or Rex if Pex–1 ≤ Poffer  
 
 
Rights issue TERP adjustment with Rdiscadj,ex2  
with placing: ex-day Nnew in TERP = no. of  with Nnew = no. of  
(ex-day is after AD) shares issued pro rata shares in rights issue 
 
Open offer: ex-day TERP adjustment: Rterpadj, Rdiscadj,ex  
(ex-day is same as AD) or Rex if Pex–1 ≤ Poffer  
 
 
Open offer TERP adjustment: Rterpadj, Rdiscadj,ex1  
with placing: ex-day or Rex if Pex–1 ≤ Poffer   
(ex-day is same as AD)    
 
Placing: AD Unadjusted return: Rad  Rdiscadj,ad3 
(no ex-day)   
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1Assumes adjustment is made for the discount of shares in the placing. Nnew = number of 
shares in the rights issue or open offer only, if no adjustment is made. 
2Assumes the event period includes the ex-day. 
3Unadjusted return if no adjustment is made for the discount of shares in the placing. 
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Table 2 
Details of types of issue 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Rights issues 47 
of which 
 ex date on AD+1 12 
 ex date after AD+1 35 
 accompanied by a firm placing1 5 
 
Open offers 134 
of which 
 ex date on AD2 110 
 ex date on AD+1 22 
 ex date after AD+1 2 
 accompanied by a firm placing1 89 
 
Placings 80 
 
Full sample 261 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes 
1 A firm placing is a placing of shares that have not been offered pro rata to existing 
shareholders. Some rights issues and open offers include shares which have been pre-
renounced; they were offered pro rata but renounced by the relevant shareholder(s) and 
privately placed with other investors before the offer was publicly announced. For the 
purposes of the current paper, pre-renounced shares are counted as part of the rights issue or 
open offer. 
2 The source of the ex-dates is the London Share Price Database. The ex-date or expected ex-
date is only recorded in 31 of the open offer prospectuses. In seven cases the ex-dates in the 
prospectus and LSPD differ, and in these cases we use the LSPD date. ‘The data is collected 
from a number of recognised sources, including the Stock Exchange Daily Official List, the 
Financial Times and Extel’s EXSHARE service. Where possible, data is taken from more 
than one independent source to provide checks on its accuracy’ (LSPD Reference Manual, 
2009, p. 5). 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3 
Average abnormal returns on announcement by type of offer and by adjustment for discount 
 
The table shows average abnormal returns (AARs) for three types of SEO made by UK companies during 2003-06, using the three methods of 
calculating share returns given by equations (12) to (14). The ARs are market-adjusted ARs, as in equation (12), for the period AD–1 to AD+1. 
The proportion positive is the proportion of ARs of at least zero. The t-statistic in italics below the AARs is √n(AAR)/stdev(AR), and the t for the 
difference between two AARs is (AAR1 – AAR2)/√[var(AR1)/n1 +  var(AR2)/n2], where n1 is the number of issues in the first sample. 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Rights issues Open offers Placings t-stats for difference in AARs 
       Open Placings Placings 
Method of  AAR Prop’n AAR Prop’n AAR Prop’n offers less less rights less open   
calculating returns  (%) positive  (%) positive  (%) positive rights issues issues offers  
 
(i) Rtns using Datastream’s –2.97 .38 0.95 .54 –1.08 .56 1.90 0.83 –1.24 
adjusted prices (eq. (12)) –1.62  1.01  –0.81 
 
(ii) Rtns using TERP –2.98 .38 1.79 .59 na na 2.31 na na 
adjustment (eq. (13)) –1.63  2.24     
 
(iii) Discount-adjusted rtns –0.39 .43 4.98 .65 5.04 .69 2.61 2.39 0.04 
(eq. (14)) –0.20  4.31  3.26 
 
t-statistic for (ii) – (i) 0.00  0.68  na   
 
t-statistic for (iii) – (i) 0.97  2.70  2.99 
 
Number in sample 47  134  80 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4 
Average abnormal returns in previous event studies of UK rights issues, open offers and placings 
 
The data provider’s adjusted prices were used, or are assumed to have been used, in all the papers except Espenlaub et al (2009). *** (**) (*) = significant at 
the 1% (5%) (10%) level, as reported by the relevant authors. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Sample Event period Rights issues Open offers Placings Data 
 period (AD is 0) AAR AAR AAR provider 
 
Burton, Lonie  1989-91 –1 to 0 –7.8%**  –0.6%  Not stated 
& Power (1999)    (non-rights issues) 
 
Slovin, Sushka 1986-94 –1 to 0 –3.1%***  3.3%*** Extel 
& Lai (2000) 
 
Armitage (2002) 1985-96 –1 to 0 –2.2%*** 2.0%***  Extel 
 
 
Korteweg &  1992-99 –1 to +1 –1.8%* 4.1%*** 1.6% Datastream 
Renneboog (2003)      & Extel 
 
Barnes & Walker 1989-98 –1 to +1 –1.0%  0.6% Datastream 
(2006)  
 
Iqbal, Espenlaub 1991-95 –1 to 0  –1.1%  Datastream 
& Strong (2009) 
 
Espenlaub, Iqbal 1991-95 –1 to 0  2.95% Datastream’s unadjusted prices  
& Strong (2009)    ‘significant’  with separate TERP adjustment 
       
Balachandran et al  1996-05 –1 to +1 –1.6%***  –0.2% Datastream 
(2009)     
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Table 5 
Correlations between abnormal returns and discounts 
 
The table shows correlation coefficients between announcement ARs in our sample calculated 
using the returns in equations (12) to (14), and discounts or premiums given by (Pad–1 – 
Poffer)/Pad–1. The t-statistic is correl√[(n–2)/(1 – correl2)], where n is the number of paired 
observations and correl is the correlation coefficient. 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
ARs using Rights issues Open offers Placings 
 
Datastream’s adjusted prices: 
equation (12) –0.28 –0.38 –0.43 
t-statistic –1.95 –4.68 –4.24 
 
TERP adjustment: 
equation (13) –0.28 –0.22 na 
t-statistic –1.95 –2.62 na 
 
Adjustment for discount: 
equation (14) –0.08 0.12 0.11 
t-statistic –0.52 1.33 1.02 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
